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Introduction 
 There are good laws and there are bad laws.  The “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 
1996,” also known as D’Amato Act  after its sponsor Senator Alfonse D’Amato, is a bad 
one.  It is bad because it hurts American businesses and international standing of the 
United States government without delivering its stated objectives.  One cannot deny that 
the law has and will continue to inflict economic costs on Iran.  But the cost to Iran, while 
significant, has not been of the magnitude to cause a significant change in that country’s 
posture or rhetoric.  On the other hand, the costs to American companies and to 
America’s international prestige are substantial. 
 The D’Amato law declares that “it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran 
the ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund the development and 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by limiting the 
development of Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline 
petroleum resources of Iran.”1 To this end the congress directs the president to impose a 
number of sanctions on companies that make an investment of 20 million dollars or more 
or any combination of investment of at least 10 million each, which in the aggregate 
equals or exceeds 20 million in any 12-month period, “that directly and significantly 
contributed to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources of Iran.”2
 The D’Amato law follows the Executive Order No.  12959 of May 6, 1995 issued 
by President Clinton which in turn reinforced the Executive Order of 1987. In 1987 
imports of goods from Iran to the United States were prohibited.  But foreign affiliates of 
American companies continued to buy substantial amount of Iran’s oil.  The Executive 
Order of 1995 prohibited export of American goods, services, and technology to Iran. It 
banned investment by American companies in Iran, and prohibited US persons from 
approving, facilitating or financing American owned companies to make transactions 
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involving Iran, thus, closing the loophole of the Executive order of 1987. The D’Amato 
law is designed to extend these prohibitions, by the force of sanctions, to companies and 
nationals of other countries as far as the Iranian oil and gas industry is concerned. In 
particular, the President may impose a number of sanctions on companies who invest in 
Iran’s petroleum industries.3
 These sanctions will be removed when the President determines and certifies to 
the congress that Iran has ceased its efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons, and ballistic missiles, and has been removed from the list of governments 
supporting acts of international terrorism.   
 These sanctions may include denial of assistance from 
Export-Import Bank, denial of permits to export goods and technology to the sanctioned 
persons, prohibition of United States financial institutions from making loans to the 
offending companies, and refusal of the U.S. government to procure goods and services 
from violators of these sanctions.  If the violators are financial firms, they may not be 
designated as primary dealers in United States government debt instruments, or serve as 
her agents, or as repository for government funds. 
 Ostensibly, the US sanctions have been enacted to bring pressure on Iran to 
abandon her support of terrorism and subversion of the region, efforts to produce 
weapons of mass destruction, and opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process. But it is 
said that domestic politics, particularly, the 1996 presidential elections and the power 
struggle over foreign policy between the Congress and the President may have resulted in 
adopting the harsh measures. 
 In what follows we will argue that embargoes and sanctions outlined above are 
detrimental to the United State’s leadership and harm American economic interests, and 
in all likelihood, they will not change Iran’s behavior.   
International Sanctions and the United State’s Leadership 
 With the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States has attained the status 
of the sole superpower in the world.  She holds this position militarily, economically, and 
politically.  Since the 19th century when the Great Britain ruled the waves and sun did not 
set on her empire, no nation has been in this position.  To state the obvious, the time has 
changed and the condition of the United States as the world leader is quite different from 
 3 
that of Britain a century ago.  The United States position rests, in addition to its economic 
and military power, on morality of its positions and her defense of certain principles.  In 
particular, the United States advocates human rights, liberal democracy, free trade, 
independence and integrity of sovereign nations, and denunciation of the use of force in 
international affairs. The law in question is in conflict with these basic principles. 
 The only time the United States can legitimately and effectively exercise its power 
is when she has built an international consensus  on the necessity and morality of her 
cause.  Here lies the difference between the two centuries, the United States is the first 
among equals, by far the first. Consensus building has to precede any action by the United 
States government.  The necessity and viability of this course of action was shown in the 
crisis over the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.  On the other hand, until President Clinton 
reversed the direction of the U.S. policy in Bosnia Herzegovina, the noninvolvement 
policy of his predecessor had brought worldwide criticism.  Morality is not divisible and 
cannot be selective.  
 Leading by consensus is a remarkable departure from the norm of conduct during 
the cold war era.  Up until the end of the Soviet empire, the western world universally 
accepted the US leadership in the design and implementation of international relations 
and policies.  Today, even though there is no world military or economic power of 
comparable strength to the United States, most nations tend to follow their own 
independent international policies.  The United States’ preeminence and hegemony is 
being challenged and undermined by friends and foes alike.  This, from an American 
point of view, is an unfortunate phenomenon which, if it is not reversed before it takes 
hold in the international psyche, would have damaging long run effect.  It could erode the 
United States’ abilities to lead the world in the direction that enhances her interests.  The 
United States cannot follow policies that ignore other countries sovereignty and interests 
which leads to the perception of US arrogance.  Neither can she be oblivious to the 
growing strain and annoyance of other countries whose interest and sovereignty are being 
undermined by American foreign policies.  This sentiment has succinctly been expressed 
by James Schlesinger:   
“It is essential for us [the United States], if we wish to continue to lead in 
the way we have, to avoid gratuitously antagonizing other nations.  The 
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tendency for others to bond together to cut the leader down to size is, of 
course, a variable.  Clearly, if a leader fails to refrain from exasperating 




 Perhaps the most damaging part of the sanctions to American prestige is in the 
international trade arena. The United States has consistently and forcefully advocated free 
trade. Sanctions are impediments to the free flow of goods, services, and capital. The 
main argument behind free trade is that it is beneficial to countries that adopt it regardless 
of other nations’ action. Imposing sanctions on other countries in order to punish them 
contradicts the argument for free trade. If the idea behind the free trade is correct, then the 
country that adopts the sanctions is reducing her own people’s welfare. Still a country 
may be on a firmer ground when restricting her own nationals from dealing with others. 
When sanctions take an extraterritorial character they are quite indefensible. Such 
unilateral actions violate the spirit if not the letter of the World Trade Organization. The 
idea behind GATT and WTO is to replace unilateral and bilateral ad hoc actions with 
rules and procedures accepted and followed by the community of nations. Unilateral 
sanctions on companies of other nations who deal with a third country can only be 
interpreted as the United States’ belief that she is above and exempt from international 
rules and procedures.  
 The French government support of Total in her deal with Iran should be seen in 
this light. European economies are more dependent on international trade than the United 
States economy is. When the American government, without consulting her allies, 
decrees that European companies should not deal with Iran, Cuba, or Libya,  the action 
will be seen as arrogant. They resist what they consider encroachment on their national 
sovereignty. 
 The argument for moral grounds in the American leadership cannot be 
exaggerated. Events of the last seven years, the Persian Gulf War, civil war in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, international concern over environment, and the Middle East peace process, 
to name a few, have underlined its importance. Nevertheless, the cost of sanctions to the 
United States is not restricted to intangibles of moral leadership and prestige. It can be 
measured in tangible commercial opportunity costs. 
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2. The Economic Costs of Sanctions to the United States 
 To assess the economic costs of the sanctions, we should consider the unique 
position of Iran in the energy map of the world.  
 Iran is sitting on the second largest reserves of natural gas in the world, estimated 
at 741 trillion cubic feet, and also has considerable oil resources. More important, the eye 
of oil companies are presently on the vast oil reserves of Caspian Sea which is estimated 
to be between 90 and 200 billion barrels. Exploitation of these resources as well as their 
transportation require cooperation from Iran. She is the strongest country after Russia that 
has a stake in the resources of the sea. Moreover, the safest and the most economical way 
of transporting oil passes through Iran. Indeed, Iran is almost indispensable for trade with 
the former Soviet Republics of  Central Asia. To these advantages one should add the 
strategic location of Iran with regard to the Persian Gulf through which a large part of 
world crude oil passes en route to international markets. Iran is making her military 
presence felt in the Persian Gulf. 
 The unique position of Iran's energy resources has rendered her a potentially 
profitable market for international investors and an accessible market for exporters.  The 
recent agreements with the French company Total can only be regarded as the tip of the 
iceberg.  Moreover, revenues from oil and gas exports have turned Iran into a lucrative 
market for goods and services.  In 1995, Iran imported more than 12.5 billion dollars in 
goods alone. She could have imported more than 18 billion dollars had it not been for the 
necessity to repay her foreign debts. 
 Potential trade and investment in Iran have been recognized by American 
companies.  As mentioned above, before 1995 American companies continued trading 
with Iran through their subsidiaries.  In 1995, the U.S. firm Conoco, Inc. had initialed and 
finalized a contract with Iran to develop oil fields in the Persian Gulf.  President Clinton 
invoked the National Emergency Economic Powers Act, and Conoco had to withdraw 
from the deal.  Conoco’s loss was the French company Total’s gain.  The same could be 
said about the more recent deal worth two billion dollars that involves French, Russian, 
and Malaysian companies.5  Newsweek (November 24, 1997) reported that “at a recent 
World Petroleum Congress in Beijing, Fereydoun Barkeshli of the Institute for 
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International Oil studies in Tehran, found unanimous US oil-firm support for an Iranian 
pipeline route for Caspian Sea oil.”  In general, given America’s technological superiority 
and its financial might, there is no question that American firms would fare very well, 
should they be allowed to bid on Iranian projects.  The embargo, and D’Amato Act are 
robbing American companies of the opportunity.  Thus, the only tangible consequence of 
sanctions has been the loss of business and investment opportunities for American firms.  
They have been shut out of investment in Iranian gas projects, and are in a disadvantage 
regarding the exploitation of the Caspian Sea oil resources. 
 While U.S. companies have to watch from sidelines, European defiance 6
 To sum up, sanctions hurt American firms, cause a rift between the United States 
and its European allies and, in return, increase the cost of doing business for Iran. 
 and 
resentment of American sanctions with its extraterritorial and big brother overtone are 
understandable.  Iran is commercially important to Europe. America’s unilateral measures 
requiring Europeans to give up a lucrative market and investment opportunities meets 
resistance.  Perhaps the recent return of European ambassadors to Tehran best illustrates 
the importance of Iran for Europe. Some time ago a Berlin court found Iran’s high 
government officials guilty of complicity in terrorist attacks on German soil. In the 
diplomatic struggle that ensued, European ambassadors left Iran. Their return to Tehran 
and their expressed enthusiasm for renewed economic ties with that country while a boon 
for the newly elected government of President Khatami, underlines the isolation of the 
United States in the sanctions game against Iran. 
3. The Effectiveness of Sanctions 
 The arguments in favor and against sanctions can be summarized as follows. 
Those in favor of sanctions believe that the economic cost inflicted on the target country 
mobilizes the affected groups and force a change in the behavior of that nation. Those 
who oppose sanctions believe that by severing economic ties—be it disinvestment, denial 
of credit, or exports and imports embargo—the imposing countries would not have any 
leverage on the sanctioned country, simply because the latter has nothing left to lose. By 
keeping economic ties, the trading partner will have the leverage to affect the behavior of 
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the target country. This is the essence of the so-called critical dialogue which Europeans 
have adopted with regard to Iran. 
 In general, the success of sanctions in altering a nation’s behavior is doubtful.  
However, they do inflict economic costs on the sanctioned country.  The magnitude of 
damage to the sanctioned country depends on the extent and severity with which the 
international community implements the sanctions. In addition, their effectiveness 
depends on the importance of the sanctioned sector(s) in the overall economy of the 
affected country, the availability of substitute markets for her exports and imports, 
duration of sanctions, dependence of the sanctioned country on the international capital, 
her ability to hoard and stockpile commodities before sanctions are in place, and the 
flexibility of her consumption and production structure. 
 Sanctions are more likely to be successful if they are imposed collectively by a 
group of nations rather than one county alone. Commitments by a reasonably large group 
of countries to engage in a collective action requires clear evidence that an important 
international norm of conduct has been violated by the offending nation. There has to be a 
villain before punishment can be meted out.  It is not unusual, therefore, that in order to 
maximize the cost to the sanctioned country, the importance of the violated norm may be 
exaggerated and the extent of villainy of the target country magnified.   
 Proponents of sanction argue that sanctions need time to work themselves into the 
international business psyche and calculus.  David Welsh, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near East Affairs reported that, “many of the allies have been reluctant to grant Iran 
extensive credit and guarantees ... We have succeeded in raising the cost to Iran.”7
 In order to exact maximum economic cost on a country, at least two conditions 
must be present.  First, the sanctioning countries must be able to control international 
trade of the sanctioned country.  Second, other trading countries must not be capable of 
 `On 
the other hand, it is argued that sanctions are not without cost to imposing countries. 
Therefore, the question is, on balance, which side is hurt more. That is, cost and benefits 
of sanctions do not represent a zero-sum game even in the sanctioning country.  There is 
always a negative welfare loss associated with sanctions in both sanctioned and 
sanctioning countries. 
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replacing the lost markets for sanctioned country’s exports or become suppliers for her 
imports.  If these conditions are obtained the sanctioned country is forced into autarky and 
she is denied all of the benefits of division of labor and international trade; her cost is 
maximized.  However, if the sanctioning countries do not control the sanctioned 
country’s international trade they can force the target country to trade at higher costs.  
Thus, a less favorable terms of trade is forced on the sanctioned country which means, 
she will export more in exchange for lesser amount of imports. 
 Even assuming that sanctions against a country are universally implemented, and 
further assuming that they have inflicted considerable economic costs on her, it is not 
clear that they would lead to a change of behavior. Cuba and Iraq come to mind. It is hard 
to imagine imposing a more restrictive set of sanctions than those imposed on these 
countries. No doubt the ordinary people of Iraq and Cuba have suffered immeasurably. 
Yet it is hard to discern any change in the posture of either country.  If anything, the 
ruling click, who by no means are supported by their people, have hardened their 
position. Neither there is any logical reason to believe a nation or a person would change 
its beliefs or behavior because of economic hardship. 
 Despite their dismal record of success, the frequency of imposing international 
economic sanctions has increased. It may be that they are the best substitute for military 
intervention and war. Sanctions are somewhere between diplomatic effort and outright 
war. They portray of decisiveness on the part of the leadership and since they do not 
require military force and bloodshed, they are less objectionable by the world community 
as well by the domestic interest groups. Outcomes of public policies depend on the 
relative influences of interest groups in generating political pressures and by exerting 
these pressures, they help determine “the extent and types of sanctions selected.”  
According to the public choice theory, “Political efficiency prevails when the marginal 
utility to the groups benefiting from a given regulation or policy, weighted by the group’s 
political influence, is equal to the influences-weighted marginal disutility to the loser 
group ... [but], in general, the losers will lose more than the beneficiaries gain.”8
4. The Effects of Sanctions on Iran 
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 In the case of Iran, the sanctions are not universally applied.  Thus, while Iran has 
undergone economic costs, the damage is not substantial.  It is true that Iran needs 
American market, capital, and technology.  As Conoco deal showed Iranians’ first choice 
would have been an American company.  But both Western and Eastern European 
countries, as well as Japan and Southeast Asian countries have been too happy to oblige.  
Iran earns close to 20 billion dollars annually from its exports and it is difficult for many 
countries to give up on such a market. 
 If the purpose of the sanctions is to force Iran to drop her quest for weapons of 
mass destruction and support for terrorism, then a critical dialogue would be a more 
effective tool.  Iran, unlike Iraq, has never used chemical9
 It may be that the objective is to force Iran to publicly denounce its past policies 
and make a pledge not to seek biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.  
And to make such statements in a way that leaves no doubt she is seeking reprieve from 
economic sanctions. In other words, the purpose may be to avenge her hostage taking and 
the defeat of President Carter in the 1980 elections. Such statements would not be 
forthcoming regardless of economic costs. 
 or biological weapons and its 
nuclear facilities have been open to international inspection.  Her support for terrorist acts 
has waned over the years and, to be sure, trading partners have a much greater leverage in 
persuading Iran to seek her goals through diplomatic channels. 
 First, the government of Iran is founded on ideological principles that prohibits 
submission regardless of the cost.  This point was well illustrated during the eight year 
war brought by the Iraqi invasion of Iran.  Second, it should be noted that despite the 
well-known and well-documented human rights infractions of the regime, particularly in 
the early years of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s political system is the closest to a 
democracy of any country in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel. Political 
differences are freely aired in the Majlis (Parliament)and in the media.10
Conclusions 
 If the faction that 
controls the executive branch makes a move in the direction of an apology, it will be 
exploited by the opposition as giving in to the enemies of the revolution.   
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 The election of Mohammad Khatami to presidency, if he succeeds in controlling 
all organs of the government, heralds a new era in the political life of Iran. Khatami 
campaigned on a platform of tolerance, human rights, particularly for women, rule of law, 
civil society, peaceful coexistence, and dialogue rather than confrontation.  He won by a 
landslide of two thirds majority.  The intransigence of the United States in imposing 
economic sanctions weakens Khatami’s position vis-à-vis his opponents.  Removal of the 
sanctions would strengthen him against his rivals without giving the appearance that 
somehow he is playing the American game. 
 Perhaps sometime governments and nations behave like individuals, that is, they 
decide on the basis of emotions rather than cool mathematical logic. Imposing sanctions 
on a “rogue” state would make everyone feel good. But if economic benefits of the 
United States, and her international standing are considered, and the objective is to bring 
about a change in policies and international conduct of the Iranian government, removal 
of sanctions and repeal of D’Amato law are clearly indicated. 
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